Info-Blatt 01/10 vom Mai 2010

In the aftermath of Copenhagen

By Guy Brasseur and Reimund Schwarze, Hamburg/Leipzig

The UNFCCC’s 15th conference of the parties (COP15), held in Copenhagen (Denmark), was approached as the “Hopenhagen meeting”. It came with high hopes for break through successes. In fact, a break through process happened, but whether the so-called Copenhagen Accord (CA) was a success or failure is still much disputed. Was it a “sham deal” or no deal at all? Consequently, there was a lot of uncertainty about the future of international climate negotiations - and much looking into the crystal ball. This comment will give a very personal view, nothing more than just another judgement but hopefully one informed. It is based on the Post-Copenhagen developments and scientific findings from the economic theory on international negotiations.

At the outset, it is important to note that the Copenhagen Accord is embedded into a large, pre-existing body of international law and climate change and must be judged against this background. This body consists, firstly, of the Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) with its two central principles enshrined into Article 2 – the stabilisation of greenhouse gases to avoid dangerous interferences with the climate system – and Article 3, the principle of common but differentiated responsibility. The latter is often interpreted as implying a ‘world of two’ – developed countries with historic and actual responsibilities, and developing countries with no historic and no actual responsibilities for the problem of climate change. It is ratified and signed by 194 nations and institutionalised in regular COP meetings - so, by all standards of political sciences of international law, it is an advanced regime of international politics and law. Second is the Kyoto Protocol – a legally binding international contract for 190 signatory nations with well known quantitative targets on six greenhouse gases. It is embodied into the CMP process. Finally, there is the Bali Plan of Action – a two track working plan on long-term concerted action and the further development of the Kyoto protocol. In parallel, we saw a process of international negotiations of the “big boys” (G8+x), large emitters or representatives of international organisations taking place in Gleneagles, Heiligendamm or L’Aquila, where major break through decisions were taken such as halving the global emissions by 2050. The picture that emerges is a complicated multi-layer, multi-track international negotiation process on climate change. This process will continue exactly along these lines, taking note of the outcomes of the Copenhagen Accord.  The CA will be the centre piece of advancing the UNFCCC and Post-Kyoto process in Mexico City (COP16). It makes sense, therefore, to highlight the most important features of the CA:

· Parties agreed that stabilization at around 2° C temperature increase against pre-industrial level would be sufficient to avoid dangerous interference with the climate system. As such it provides a meaningful interpretation of the lengthily disputed Article 2 of the UNFCCC.
· They agreed that “deep cuts in global emissions” are required with the view to hold the global temperature increase below 2 degrees “as soon as possible”. However, they avoided to agree on concrete targets for 2020 global emissions – although they were proposed in initial negotiation drafts of the CA.
· They instead agreed on a process of unilateral voluntary commitments for emission targets in 2020 for developed countries, and national appropriate mitigation actions (NAMAs) for developing countries. Importantly these NAMAs are not to be verified in an international oversight process as long as they are not funded by foreign sources.

· NAMAs incorporate – for the first time in COP negotiation history – measures to reduce emissions from deforestation and forest degradation (REDD).
· The Copenhagen Accord also promises scaled up, new and additional funding of 30 bill. US-Dollar (USD) over the next three years, growing to 100 bill. USD in 2020.

The pledges for emissions reductions of developing nations’ targets and NAMAs for developing countries are in by now. 75 countries of the world “pledged” and thereby indicated their general consent with the CA approach of short-term and long-term emission reductions.

The pledges are extremely heterogeneous if compared to the Kyoto framework of actions. Some are based on 1990, others on the years 2000 or 2005. Often they are conditional open stances taken by other countries. For example, Australia pledges only 5% if there is no global deal on securing atmospheric concentrations of greenhouses gases at 450 ppm (part per million) and major developing countries do refrain from substantial emission reductions; 25% if both conditioned are fulfilled. Most pledges repeat the targets as they had been aired before Copenhagen. Some (e.g. the U.S.) even falls short of this.

Table 1: Industrialized countries pledges (few selected)

see pdf Info-Blatt

Similarly, developing countries’ pledges are very diverse. Some promise de-carbonization (e.g. the Maledives) or long-term carbon neutrality (e.g. Costa Rica); other promise smaller or larger deviations from Business as Usual (BAU).  Most are quantified in one way or another - which is a success and in clear difference to the previous ‘world of two’ interpretation of Article 3 UNFCCC.

Table 2: Developing countries pledges (selected)

see pdf Info-Blatt

Judgement on the CA’s pledges:

· The Copenhagen Accord goal of limiting warming to below 2°C is not consistent with current 2020 emission reduction pledges
· Developed country aggregate does not meet the -25 - -40% range (below 1990) which would be consistent with the lowest stabilization scenario in IPCC
· Surplus emission allowances and forestry accounting can significantly degrade the pledges of developed nations (especially in Russia)
· To achieve the EU27’s low ambition target of 20% below 1990 is inconsistent with the  long term goal of - 80-95% compared to 1990 by 2050
· China and India’s emission per unit GDP targets are equivalent to business-as-usual
· Brazil’s targets are ambitious but mainly based on measures to avoid deforestation that are hard to verify and difficult to sustain
· ·o achieve stated Copenhagen Accord goal, countries should adopt longer term emission reduction goals (at least 50% below 1990 globally by 2050)

Summary judgement on CA:

The CA is in at least two aspects an important step ahead. It defines the meaning of Art. 2 UNFCCC („2°C goal“), and, for the first time, it involves all major emitters of the world. However, it bears major weaknesses. It is a purely political decision, not legally binding as previous climate policies, and it is based on a bottom-up process of pledge and review. Lacking verification for unilateral activities in developing countries, the review process for Non-Annex countries is weak and teeth-less. What is clearly missing are links to market-based instruments such as global emission trading. Also missing are long-term targets (2050) and reference to any „peaking period”

Results are largely in line with four key findings from the economic analysis of international environmental agreements, which are:

1. Large homogenous clubs are less conducive to stable (self-enforcing) agreements than small or inhomogeneous groups. 
2. In case of inhomogeneous groups, freely negotiated side-payments according to the ‘principle of willingness to pay’ are necessary. Large homogenous clubs are less conducive to stable agreements than small or inhomogeneous groups. 
3. There are important incentives to ‘free ride’, but the ‘prisoner’s dilemma’ is just one potential outcome
4. A perceived risk of ‘climate catastrophe’ favors ‘chicken game’-type solutions (free riding)

Based on these politico-economics findings, we recommend:

1. Mitigation should stay the key target of international climate negotiations!
2. Credible  scenarios of  ‘Inaction’ and ‘Tipping points’ of the world’s climate increase the probability of international agreements on mitigation
3. (Parallel) free negotiations in G8+x settings can break the way for (incomplete) international agreements on ‘deep cuts’ in global emissions
4. The analysis of fragmented  policies and markets, and carbon-leakage are important future issues for research  
5. We need a national strategy both adapation (plan B) and geo-engineering research (Plan C).